Learning to be Moral (2024)

@inbook{0191ee6094824897aa9dfd39720caad0,

title = "Learning to be Moral",

abstract = "In her paper, Julia Hermann argues that being moral requires moral competence, which is developed in practice. What makes us moral is not the teaching of moral principles, or a desire for happiness, or any kind of argument, but growing up in an environment which enables us to develop the rational and emotional capacities necessary for moral agency. Hermann discusses Gilbert Ryle{\textquoteright}s distinction between knowing how and knowing that and suggests conceiving of what the moral agent knows as primarily a form of knowing how. She addresses Ryle{\textquoteright}s own objections to this view, which he formulated in his two relatively unknown papers “On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong” (1958) and “Can virtue be taught?” (1972). Hermann discusses Ryle{\textquoteright}s reasons for claiming that virtues are not skills, and looks at different skill models of virtue. Unlike Ryle, she stresses the ways in which virtue is like a mastery, pointing out that moral teaching and learning involve a significant amount of training. Finally, Hermann argues that it follows from her account of moral competence that the philosophical conception of the amoralist is implausible.",

author = "Julia Hermann",

year = "2013",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-9400763425",

pages = "207--223",

editor = "Bert Musschenga and {van Harskamp}, Anton",

booktitle = "What Makes Us Moral",

publisher = "Springer",

}

Learning to be Moral. / Hermann, Julia.
What Makes Us Moral: On the Capacities and Conditions for being Moral. ed. / Bert Musschenga; Anton van Harskamp. Dordrecht et. al.: Springer, 2013. p. 207-223.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic › peer-review

TY - CHAP

T1 - Learning to be Moral

AU - Hermann, Julia

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In her paper, Julia Hermann argues that being moral requires moral competence, which is developed in practice. What makes us moral is not the teaching of moral principles, or a desire for happiness, or any kind of argument, but growing up in an environment which enables us to develop the rational and emotional capacities necessary for moral agency. Hermann discusses Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that and suggests conceiving of what the moral agent knows as primarily a form of knowing how. She addresses Ryle’s own objections to this view, which he formulated in his two relatively unknown papers “On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong” (1958) and “Can virtue be taught?” (1972). Hermann discusses Ryle’s reasons for claiming that virtues are not skills, and looks at different skill models of virtue. Unlike Ryle, she stresses the ways in which virtue is like a mastery, pointing out that moral teaching and learning involve a significant amount of training. Finally, Hermann argues that it follows from her account of moral competence that the philosophical conception of the amoralist is implausible.

AB - In her paper, Julia Hermann argues that being moral requires moral competence, which is developed in practice. What makes us moral is not the teaching of moral principles, or a desire for happiness, or any kind of argument, but growing up in an environment which enables us to develop the rational and emotional capacities necessary for moral agency. Hermann discusses Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that and suggests conceiving of what the moral agent knows as primarily a form of knowing how. She addresses Ryle’s own objections to this view, which he formulated in his two relatively unknown papers “On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong” (1958) and “Can virtue be taught?” (1972). Hermann discusses Ryle’s reasons for claiming that virtues are not skills, and looks at different skill models of virtue. Unlike Ryle, she stresses the ways in which virtue is like a mastery, pointing out that moral teaching and learning involve a significant amount of training. Finally, Hermann argues that it follows from her account of moral competence that the philosophical conception of the amoralist is implausible.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 978-9400763425

SP - 207

EP - 223

BT - What Makes Us Moral

A2 - Musschenga, Bert

A2 - van Harskamp, Anton

PB - Springer

CY - Dordrecht et. al.

ER -